Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Fiction: a counterfactual assumption or history. In philosophy, it is the question how a truth value can be attributed to fictional statements. See also idealization, as if, truth, facts, counterfactuals, theories, theoretical entities, existence, ontology.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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IV 261
Fiction/Truth/Lewis: (Meinongian view) E.g. one can indeed say that Holmes and Nixon belong to the same category: humans. - Unlike E.g. intelligences from steam - E.g. collection: E.g. assuming a large choir in a story: we should not say that its members do not exist because we cannot specify their number - and that is because we can already say something true about the choir.
IV 265
Truth/Fiction/Lewis: E.g. Holmes stories would be true in a possible world, where the corresponding things occur - difficult problem: Holmes and Watson could be reversed! - Problem: capturing the "plot" of a Holmes story (in order to exclude the irrelevant) - Kripke: if by chance in the actual world someone was like Holmes, "Holmes" would still not refer to this person.
IV 265
Fiction/Lewis: not abstract number of sentences, but rather the act of narration - different on different occasions - could simultaneously bring 2 different fictions: a) harmless for children - b) explosive for the initiated - the possible world that we should look at is the one in which the story is told, but as a known fact rather than fiction -> E.g. Don Quixote/Pierre Menard: not copied, but told again.
IV 267
Fiction/Name/Lewis: The way the name is used in fiction, it is not rigid - it depends more on the designation.
IV 269
Truth/Fiction/Lewis: read as counterfactual conditionals - Definition truth/Fiction: thesis: an unreal conditional clause (counterfactual conditional/Co.Co.) of the form "if f, then it would be the case that y" is non-trivially true if a possible world, in which both are true, differs less from our real world than any possible world in which f is true and y is not true. (The rear part is not true) - ((s)> similarity metric) - ((s) actual world as third, as a reference point for measuring similarity between possible worlds) - absurd question: what blood type was Holmes? - Solution: bundle of possible worlds - "the worlds of Holmes" - it all depends on which possible world is our real world.
IV 272
Truth in fiction: should not depend on our assumptions about the background, otherwise this truth would be constantly changing - Solution: the crucial background is the one shared by the community at the time when the fiction arose.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-01-24