Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Fiction: a counterfactual assumption or history. In philosophy, it is the question how a truth value can be attributed to fictional statements. See also idealization, as if, truth, facts, counterfactuals, theories, theoretical entities, existence, ontology.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 261
Fiction/Truth/Lewis: (Meinongian view) E.g. one can indeed say that Holmes and Nixon belong to the same category: humans. - Unlike E.g. intelligences from steam - E.g. collection: E.g. assuming a large choir in a story: we should not say that its members do not exist because we cannot specify their number - and that is because we can already say something true about the choir.
IV 265
Truth/Fiction/Lewis: E.g. Holmes stories would be true in a possible world, where the corresponding things occur - difficult problem: Holmes and Watson could be reversed! - Problem: capturing the "plot" of a Holmes story (in order to exclude the irrelevant) - Kripke: if by chance in the actual world someone was like Holmes, "Holmes" would still not refer to this person.
IV 265
Fiction/Lewis: not abstract number of sentences, but rather the act of narration - different on different occasions - could simultaneously bring 2 different fictions: a) harmless for children - b) explosive for the initiated - the possible world that we should look at is the one in which the story is told, but as a known fact rather than fiction -> E.g. Don Quixote/Pierre Menard: not copied, but told again.
IV 267
Fiction/Name/Lewis: The way the name is used in fiction, it is not rigid - it depends more on the designation.
IV 269
Truth/Fiction/Lewis: read as counterfactual conditionals - Definition truth/Fiction: thesis: an unreal conditional clause (counterfactual conditional/Co.Co.) of the form "if f, then it would be the case that y" is non-trivially true if a possible world, in which both are true, differs less from our real world than any possible world in which f is true and y is not true. (The rear part is not true) - ((s)> similarity metric) - ((s) actual world as third, as a reference point for measuring similarity between possible worlds) - absurd question: what blood type was Holmes? - Solution: bundle of possible worlds - "the worlds of Holmes" - it all depends on which possible world is our real world.
IV 272
Truth in fiction: should not depend on our assumptions about the background, otherwise this truth would be constantly changing - Solution: the crucial background is the one shared by the community at the time when the fiction arose.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

David K. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-19