Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Colours: in philosophy, the problem of coulour is, among other things, the question of how individual sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Colour - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 117 Color/Color Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: red cannot be defined. >Definitions. I 165 Color/Color Words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: if colors were only represented by different names, that would be all the incompatibility - (no contradiction, no logical incompatibility) - on the other hand: if it is real functions that the points in the field of vision project on the color space (Wittgenstein pro), then there is real logical incompatibility .- "Red" and "green" as mere names are not contradictory - but they are when it comes to one single point - "(form of thought: Third) - (Hintikka: not explicit in Wittgenstein). >Contradictions, >Names. I 191/192 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The "colors" are not things that have certain properties so that you could easily look for colors or imagine colors that we do not know yet." I 323 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not want to let the differences between the individual experience of colors disappear. - On the contrary: public language must adapt to the nature of these experiences. I 324 It is not about "publicly used", but about "accessible for the public" - E.g. Robinson: must behave in a certain way for us to say that he plays a language game with himself. >Language Game. I 349 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is impossible to drive a wedge between physical and phenomenological color attribution... I 343 ...nor between pain and pain behavior. >Behavior. I 276ff Color/Color Words/Color Concepts/Color Theory/Experience/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at the end, we may delete the color experiences from our statements. I 377 The experiences, however, can be deleted just as little as pain - Color experience is, however, not about spontaneous expressions like sensations - WittgensteinVsPsychological Color Theories - VsEffect Theories of color - color tables are neither linguistically nor behavioristically bound. I 378 But our color words are not based on tables - (that would be like trying to put the rules above the language game)... I 379 ...nor on memories. I 380 Because of their privacy, our notions cannot be used in public language games. I 381 Solution: people simply follow certain language games - this is conceptual, not psychological - in the case of "red" we choose the image that comes to us while listening - (Philosophical Investigations/PI). I 383f Color/Color Words/Impression/Expression/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: We live in a world of impressions - (E.g. color impressions) - but we can only speak of them with reference to physical colors - Representation (Philosophical Investigations/PI § 280): if the painter gives a representation in addition to the image, by what right do we call both a representation? >Sensory impressions, >Representation. I 385 Although colors have a clearer structure than feelings, there is no essential difference between sensation concepts and color concepts. >Concepts. --- II 30 Colors/Color Words/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the fact that we can speak of greenish blue, but not of greenish red, is part of grammar - not psychology - Therefore, the entire color octahedron is not part of psychology. >Grammar. II 60 We need something additional to the color word "green". II 114 Color/Color Words/Grammar/Rule/Idea/Wittgenstein: it would be useless even to try to imagine red and green at the same time at the same place - on the other hand: useful: imagining to lift a man with one hand. II 118 MooreVsWittgenstein e.g. (see above) ...red and green... is a rule for "and". >Rules. II 212 Color/Notion/Wittgenstein: in color words it is essential that we envision a mental image - but this is not a mental act that animates a symbol. >Symbols. II 269 Color/General/Wittgenstein: the many instances of red have nothing in common - there is no thing that is common to all numbers. >Numbers._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Colour
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19