|Colours: in philosophy among other things, the question of how individual > sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language.|
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Color/Quine: colors are more vague than rabbits - To determine whether someone is a bachelor: you need additional information - stimulus meaning is not decisive here. - Rising line from stimulus meaning to additional information: colors - rabbit - bachelor ((s)>knowledge).
Disposition Terms/Quine: assumptions from fine structure (microstructure) - color: "red" is actually also a disposition term - Irreducible general terms - are only paraphrasable through subjunctive conditionals (counterfactual conditionals).
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Colors/Smart: color differences are rarely associated with significant physical differences - Aliens probably have concepts for length and electric charge, but not for color. - To see the world correctly we must avoid colors and secondary qualities.
Color/Quine: no concept: because nothing definite like square - not a particular color - instead: concept of color word - i.e. ""red" is a color word" (language-specific) - bad: "Red is a color" - because, for example, red and blue are as different as people whose phone number is a prime number. - ((s) There is no designating property here). - ((s) What are red and blue to have in common?) - Ostension: Problem: Color is everywhere - therefore "There is color" is a bad observation sentence.
Color similarity: always refers to exact similarity.
Color Word/Color/General Term/Singular Term/Reference/Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. you can call snow white and blood red without "white" and "red" being general terms. Snow is a diffuse part of the world which is part of a comprehensive diffuse part of the world, the White - similar: Example a) smiling mom, b) mom in general. ((s)>subset). - N.B.: against: E.g. the fact that Fido is a dog does not lead to it being part of that broader part of the world which consists of dogs, because that would also apply to his ear - (>Gavagai) - accordingly for square.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003