|Colours: in philosophy, the problem of coulour is, among other things, the question of how individual sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|I 82 f
Colors/McDowell: If the recognition of shades of color is conceptual, then we probably do not have the concepts before the color experience, but if we have the concept of a shade of color, then our conceptual potential is sufficient to capture our color experience in all its detail.
Why should recognition not be conceptual?
Fine graininess: here, the demonstrative expressions certainly play a special role. But why should they be less rationally integrated into spontaneity? (>pointing, >ostension).
Ability to distinguish: in connection with shades of color it is a permanent ability of the subject. The experience gives this potential relevance.
Color/Wittgenstein: there are no "stored classifications". No psychological machinery.
Color/McDowell: our ability to apply the concept of shade is not based on a comparison with a stored pattern._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,