Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Extension, philosophy: an object, for example, the planet Venus as a material body, independent from the manner in which it is singled out. In contrast, intension is the way in which the object is given or is represented, e.g. Morning star or Evening star. See also intensions, identity, identity conditions, reference, meaning, assertibility conditions, propositional attitudes, opacity.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Graeser I 60
Extension/Quine/Graeser: when bachelor/unmarried man are coextensive, then why are they not just randomly empirically (contingent) - not sure if it is a matter of meaning.
Lauener XI 175
Reference/Extension/singular term/general term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular terms: have a reference - general terms and sentences have an extension.
>Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine.
XII (c) 51
Predicate/co-extensive/extension-equal/coextensiveness/synonymy/Quine: coextensive predicates:
e.g. equilateral/equivalent triangle
E.g. featherless biped/rational creature: It was never clear when to say that the predicates had the same meaning.
Extension: (here = reference) is safe.
Meaning: the intension is uncertain.
Translation indeterminacy: here: across to Extension/Intension.
>Indeterminacy/Quine, >Intensions/Quine.
VII (b) 21
Extension/meaning/Quine: e.g. "living creature with heart" - "living creature with kidneys": (general term): same extension, different meaning.
VII (e) 89
Extensionality Principle/Quine:


P1 ((x ‹ y ) › ((y ‹ x) › (x = y)))

that is, a class is determined by its elements.
((s) If x and y are subsets of each other, then they are equal).
VII (f) 115
General Term/predicate/Quine: Predicates are not names of classes. This does not mean that there are not often classes that are associated with predicates without being named by them.
For example, if we are talking about the extension of a general term or predicate:
The class of all things of which the predicate is true.
Thus, the theory of validity appeals to classes but not to the individual statements represented by schemes of quantum logic (quantificational theory). Example:

(Ex)(x is a dog . x is white)

it does not involve an appeal to an abstract extension of a predicate.
>Predicates/Quine.
VII (f) 116
Truth values/extension/Quine: even validity and the extension of predicates can be eliminated through truth value tables (truth tables).
For an extensional treatment of nominalism see VII (f) 118 > Nominalism.
IX 1
Extensionality law: Classes are identical if their elements are the same. This does not apply to attributes! >Classes/Quine.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-28
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