Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Extension, philosophy: an object, for example, the planet Venus as a material body, independent from the manner in which it is singled out. In contrast, intension is the way in which the object is given or is represented, e.g. Morning star or Evening star. See also intensions, identity, identity conditions, reference, meaning, assertibility conditions, propositional attitudes, opacity.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 231f
Extension/Geach: E.g. to accept sense data as a more fundamental class of objects: If we know what sense data are, we can consider the extension of a predicate that is true only of sense data as identical to a particular physical object. - But this does not reduce the object itself to a logical construction. - ... + ... If there is an object like the range of z for which F(z), then x belongs to this range only if F(x).
I 235
Extension/Geach: it is a serious mistake to assume the objects formed the extension, they are only indirectly assigned to it as falling under the concept.
I 243
Theory/extensional/Geach: no theory, no matter how rich, may contain all classes which are the extensions of their own sentences. - (> semantic paradoxes).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

> Counter arguments against Geach

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-26