Dictionary of Arguments

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Existence statement, existence assertion, philosophy, logic: the simple assertion of the existence of an object is problematic because it cannot be empirically refuted. In contrast, quantification is the attribution of properties, not of "naked" existence. E.g. "Socrates exists" is considered by some authors as senseless. See also bare particulars, predication, existence, quantification, existence predicate, iota operator.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Martin III 182
Negative existential statements/Truthmaker/Lewis: E.g. "there are no penguins in the Arctic" is also true without truth makers - because there is no existing counter-E.g.- "deficiency" as truth maker or "lack of false makers" is just random idioms - MartinVs: a de-ontologization is superfluous - it is enough to know what we have to watch out for - instead of "how things are" better: "how the world is" - e.g. "search the hole" is completely understandable - VsHacking, Vs "manipulation" as a criterion of existence: does not work with celestial bodies.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-10
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