Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Existence, philosophy, logic: the fact that there is something to which properties can be attributed. That does not mean that something has to be given immediately or can be perceived by the senses. See also ontology, properties, predicates, existence statements, realism, quantification, ascription._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Existence - Dictionary of Arguments
V 165f Existence/ontology/criterion/AlstonVsQuine: Quine's translations, e.g. a) "length-in-miles-from" or b) "(Ex)(E is a ...)". 1. Alston: E-assumptions depend on statements, not on sentences. QuineVsVs: the translation shows that the prerequisite is made only seemingly. 2. AlstonVsQuine: the translation would allow to say everything possible, when you only reform it accordingly. V 168 Searle (like Alston): there is no criterion of mere notation. (s) General direction: Searle: facts, not language is decisive. SearleVsQuine: e.g. then you can claim all the knowledge (W) and yet only presuppose this spring here: one defines a predicate P(x) = this spring and W. Then one takes (W) as an axiom and this spring = this spring as an axiom, then "this spring = this spring and axiom (W) then "P (this spring)" then "(Ex)(Px)". Problem: the knowledge can be represented in paraphrases, which then would have to have the same ontological prerequisite as the original. (s) QuineVsVs: the conditions are only made seemingly. AlstonVsQuine: what someone says is important not how he/she puts it. Cf. >Ontology/Quine. V 172 Ontological/epistemic/Searle: e.g. "Are there terrible snow men?" is an epistemic, not an ontological question. >Ontologic/epistemic/Searle, >Fact. V 173 Existence/ontology/Searle: there are no classes of irreducible existence conditions. >Ontology/Searle._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20