Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Existence, philosophy, logic: the fact that there is something to which properties can be attributed. That does not mean that something has to be given immediately or can be perceived by the senses. See also ontology, properties, predicates, existence statements, realism, quantification, ascription._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Existence - Dictionary of Arguments
I 54 Existence: is from the standpoint of theory always a settlement. It can only be avoided by greater complexity. Arbitration: the method of arbitration: question of existence is question of evidence. I 300 Existence: the category is dependent on the point of view, but not on the existence of the objects E.g. time period. I 316 Existence: no claim of existence arises from the meaning of singular terms. >Singular Terms/Quine. I 402f Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy "single thing" - "universalia" - it does not matter whether they exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - Linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects but it makes terms accessible for all positions. >Stimuli/Quine. I 412 QuineVsProperties: there is a fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not also properties. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects and not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be true for classes instead of properties: Generic term symbolizes as much its extension as its intension. >Classes/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. II 173 Existence: "All x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? In medieval logic it does but not in modern times (thus one gains symmetry and simplicity). VII (f) 110 Existence/Ontology/Quine: is only values of bound variables: not predicates "F", not statements "p", etc. because these are not the names of entities. VII (i) 167 Existence/Quine: we can do without "a exists" when singular terms are included in description after translation. VIII 31 Existence/Quine/(s): comes ultimately only from "The word appendicitis is a name" - but do names have to denote? >Denotation/Quine. IX 29 Existence/Ontology/Quine/(s): we cannot infer the quantity from the element. ((s) An existing thing may possibly belong to many quantities) - but the fact that we state the element implies its existence as a thing - then there is also {x: Fx} if it is to be an element of something. IX 33 Existence/Quine: must not be confused with the property of being a quantity - and virtual classes must not be confused with extreme classes. Existence of a means being an element of ϑ (universal class). The property of being a quantity means that a is an element of something. Important argument: the whole point is that you do not know if ϑ is a something. If we postulate the existence of ϑ, i.e. ϑ ε ϑ, then, in fact, all things become quantities. Existent would then be the property of being a quantity. But if there are extreme classes at all now, then ϑ is not real, ϑ ε ϑ. ((s) absurd.) IX 176 Definition/Existence/Quine: does not assume existence, but a description - Vs: even classes are not created by description. IX 218 Existence/Quine: is for NF (New Foundations) plus extreme classes: the property of being a quantity: IX 221 Existence/Quine: what was existence for NF (New Foundations), becomes only the property of being a quantity - i.e. where NF (New Foundations) said "{x: Fx} ε ϑ", we now have to say "^uFu ε Uϑ", and also limit all variables that can be hidden in the "F" to quantities (i.e. "Uϑ"). Lauener XI 128 Existence/Value of a bound variable/Quine/Lauener: since "exists" is not a predicate, we need quantification. Its logic is that of the existence quantifier. Quantifiers only receive meaning when the values of the variables are identifiable. Ideology: Part of the predicates - (as opposed to logical constants and quantifiers) - values of the variables are precisely the objects. Lauener XI 130 Everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable because a predicate is an open sentence. Predicate variables only exist freely. Everything that exists are objects, not e.g. properties. >Object/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19