|Existence, philosophy, logic: the fact that there is something to which properties can be attributed. That does not mean that something has to be given immediately or can be perceived by the senses. See also ontology, properties, predicates, existence statements, realism, quantification, ascription._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frege and Russell support the thesis according to which a proper name is not a fixed term expression and is synonymous with the description that replaces it.
E.g. if "Moses" means "the man who did this and that", then Moses never existed if no one did this and that. (KripkeVs)
You could say "the Jonah in the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler in the Nazi propaganda never existed." But: existence is independent of representation.
Counterfactual: Even if you say "suppose Hitler would never have been born," then the name "Hitler" here refers, and still in a rigid manner, to something that would not exist in the described counterfactual situation.
Discovery (e.g. fossils) do not provide proof of existence of figures from myths (not sufficiently determined), I 31 , I 179._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984