|Euthyphro: (goes back to Plato's homonymous dialogue) This is about the question whether something is good because it pleases the gods or whether it pleases the gods because it is good. See also projectivism, detectivism, attribution, properties, justification, circularity.|
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Euthyphro: GeachVsSocrates: Questions of fact are not necessarily decidable - moral questions are not undecidable in principle. - Eutyhphron: GeachVs Socrates: E.g. decisions are as important as definition.
(1) What is pious is loved by the gods, because it is pious. - ((s) a = b because a - (what is __ is --)).
(2) What is beloved of God is loved by God, because it is loved by the gods. - ((s) b = b because b - (what is __is, __)).
(3) What is beloved of God is loved by the gods because it is beloved of God. (circular). - ((s) b = b because b'(what is __, is__)).
(4) What is pious is pious, because it is loved by the gods. - (s) a = a because b (or because b'!) - (what is __ is __)).
Euthyphro/Geach: Identity/Leibniz Principle: breaks in contexts which are not purely extensional - provides opaque (intense) contexts: e.g. I beat him because he was my father (because he hit me). - The truth value can differ, although it is the same man. - The falsity of the first sentence does not guarantee that another man is meant. - False: that pious acts and humans are not the same classes as those who are loved by God. - Wrong solution: Mill: God-loved/religious: same denotation/different connotation: This distinction cannot be attributed to Plato. - Plato: pious: is a form - God-loved: is not a form. - wrong solution: use: explanation: active/passive: e.g. a thing is carried because someone carries it (Geach: wrong) - someone carries a thing because it is carried (Geach: true). - This cannot be attributed to Plato.
Euthyphro/Geach: McTaggart: instead of "because" (causal but opaque) "in view of" (not causal). - Vs: missing causality does not rule out error. - I do not admire someone in terms of my own belief. - Not even gods. - Geach: the attitude is already the reason, but it does not provide the property.
Logic Matters Oxford 1972