|Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Essentialism/Terence Parsons/Cresswell: the doctrine that some things necessarily have a property that other things do not necessarily have - ParssonsVs: an essentialist theorem is false in a maximum model - and there is a maximum model for each consistent set of closed nonmodal formulas - i.e. that no physical theory contains essentialism in relation to its predicates. Problem: if we restrict the intended model by means other than axioms, it is not clear whether we can avoid essentialism.
Essentialism/necessity/possibility/Cresswell: comes through via the language that we build on the language of physics - physics only provides the entities that we need for the semantics of their language - the essentialism does not need to touch the question of the adequacy of a theory as complete framework of a physical description of the world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984