Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mention philosophy: the mention of linguistic objects must be distinguished from their use. This distinction is sometimes difficult when symbols are partly used and partly mentioned within logical formulas. One simple case of a mention of a word or phrase is the quote. See also object language, metalanguage, quote, reference, occurrence, type, token._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Mentioning - Dictionary of Arguments
V 100 Mention/Use/Language Learning/Quine: the confusion mention/use is necessary for learning: the sound of the word has approximately the same effect as the sight of the object - also transition from observation statements to timeless statements: E.g. from "Fido is a dog" to "A dog is an animal" (the confusion is ignored here). >Language Acquisition/Quine, >Learning/Quine. VII (e) 82ff Mention/use/expression/Quine: e.g. the term "(F I Y)" itself is not a formula, but a name that describes the formula. ((s) conditional probability). IX 22 Use/mention/Quine: on the right hand side of "ε" we use quantifiable variables - on the left hand side of "ε" we mention classes. >Variables/Quine, >Classes/Quine. I 339 Mentioning/Use/Russell/Whitehead/QuineVsRussell/QuineVsWhitehead: Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as if it were interchangeable with "If p, then q" (in the material sense). C. I. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p implies strictly q" and declared it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence, he developed a modal logic in which "necessary" is a sentence operator. Solution/Quine: It is best to consider "implies" and "analytical" as general terms that are predicted by sentences by adding them predictively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. I 68 Implication/mention/use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their names. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their names. So we mention the sentences by using their names. We are talking about the sentences. ((s) Implication is via the sentences. >Implication/Quine. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry This mentions Cassius but not a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. VII (e) 82 Mention/Use/Expression/Quine: For example: the expression "(φ I ψ)" is not a formula itself, but a name describing the formula. VII (f) 112f Sentence/Schema/Quine: the distinction between sentence and schema is not the same as that between mention/use. IX 22 Usage/Mention/Quine: to the right of "ε" we use quantifiable variables, to the left of "ε" we mention classes. X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (it is spoken about), the meta language is used to talk about the object language. >Metalanguage/Quine, >Object language/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18