Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Appearance, Philosophy: Apart from logical insights we receive all our insights through our senses. Therefore, it is believed that this knowledge is not only fundamentally fallible, but is more or less pre-structured by the nature of the sense organs. This structure is not necessarily so in the world outside the perceiving subjects. Because of the linguistic prestructuring of our approach to ourselves the inner life of the subjects is also not unfailingly recognizable. See also appearance, truth, certainty, knowledge, epistemology, introspection, incorrigibility.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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I 24
Sellars: seem prima facie = to be.
I 26
Seeming/Sellars: Being is more basal than seeming - Seeming is not a relationship between person, thing and property - Sense data should explain seeming - Sellars: this is unnecessary - Experience "is green" and "seems to be green" are identical. Only the first one is affirmed. (Ryle: Success word) - Seeming to be green presupposes the concept of being green. Seeming is not a relationship at all.

I 30 ff
Experience/Experience History/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of appearances.
Phenomena conceptual (to resettle them in a rational relationship to beliefs).
Appearance: Evidence for the experience differs just as little as the experiences.
I 32
Appearance: the concept of green translucence, the ability to recognize that something appears to be green, presupposes the concept of being green.

I 36
Seeming/Appearing/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of the red-seeming - we must distinguish between qualitative and existential appearance.
I 38
Seeming/Appearing/Being/Sellars: Problem: if it is asserted that physical objects cannot appear red without experiencing something that is red, the question of whether the redness that has this something is this redness that the physical object appears to have - Solution: a) on the basis of empirical generalization - b) theory of perception which refers to "direct experience".
- - -
Brandom I 425
Appearance: Sellars: two uses of "seems" or "looks like":
1) generic "seems" statements: E.g. the chicken seems to have a number of spots, but there is no specific number that it seems to have. E.g. there seem to be a lot of crumbs on the table. But it does not seem that 998 crumbs are on the table or 999.
Rorty VI 147/48
Appearing/Seeming/Explanation/SellarsVsNagel: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by scientific explanation, in turn, are language-relative. What appears to someone dependends on how one normally speaks.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-22