|Appearance, Philosophy: Apart from logical insights we receive all our insights through our senses. Therefore, it is believed that this knowledge is not only fundamentally fallible, but is more or less pre-structured by the nature of the sense organs. This structure is not necessarily so in the world outside the perceiving subjects. Because of the linguistic prestructuring of our approach to ourselves the inner life of the subjects is also not unfailingly recognizable. See also appearance, truth, certainty, knowledge, epistemology, introspection, incorrigibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Form/appearance/BrandomVsPhenomenalism: "it looks as if" just holds back approval.
Error: Understanding appearance as a cognitive act, about which one cannot be wrong - otherwise the mind would consist of infallible representations - Solution: errors and failure are not applicable here - approval that cannot be given cannot be held back - also error: attempt as an act that (as such) cannot fail.
Appearance/Phenomenalism: goes beyond supervenience: > Reductionism: perceptual conditions can only be formulated in terms of the way things are - E.g. Something cannot just appear to seem to be red without really seeming to be red. E.g. you can try to lift a weight, without actually lifting it, but you cannot just attempt to try it without really trying.
Form/appearance/Sellars: two uses: 1. E.g. the chicken seems to have a certain number of spots, but there is no specific number, which it seems to have - 2. Distinction between
a) it looks as if there is a tree
b) there is something that looks like a tree
c) over there is a tree
Understanding/Brandom: here, it "seems to be red" requires it "to be red" - Appearance: not iterable (Trying: dito)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001