Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Explanation: making a statement in relation to an event, a state, a change or an action that was described before by a deviating statement. The statement will often try to involve circumstances, history, logical premises, causes and causality. See also description, statements, theories, understanding, literal truth, best explanation, causality, cause, completeness.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 29
Inexplicable/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are.
I 190
Explanation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Metaphysics (> Duhem).
Large typescript: "Supposing my face image would be two equal red circles on a blue background: what's here available in a double number, and what just once? One could say we have a color here and two locations. But it was also said that red and circular were properties of two objects, which could be called spots and which are in a certain spatial relationship to each other. Sounds like an explanation of physics. I could also answer: two red lanterns, etc. But an explanation is not required here (trying to solve our dissatisfaction by an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics) (> Duhem) What is worrying to us, is the ambiguity about the grammar of the sentence "I see two red circles on a blue background." I can also say: "I see the color red in two different locations" but then the grammar of the words "spot", "location" , "color" would need to align to the words of the first sentence. The confusion arises here in that we believe that we have to decide about the presence or absence of an object (spot). Like when you decide whether what I see (in a physical sense) is a red coat or a reflex.
I 238
Demonstrate/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in the lectures of the early 30s the ostensive definition is downright rejected. "The ostensive definition does not lead us beyond the symbolism ... thus we can do nothing further than to replace a symbolism with another."
HintikkaVsWittgenstein: that is, one might think, blatantly wrong because gestures of pointing can well lead us away from the field of purely linguistic.
WittgensteinVsVs: denies that. He explains what we accomplish through ostensive explanation is not a connection between language and reality, but a connection between the written or spoken language on the one hand and the sign language on the other hand.
Ostensive explanation/Wittgenstein: is nothing more than a calculus.
I 255
Explanation/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as "primordial phenomena".
In the later philosophy the language games are really the measure of all things.
II 44
Indicative Definition: With this, however, nothing more is done than adding something to the symbolism.
II 45
It will not lead us beyond this symbolism. We just replace a set of symbols by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols will in turn be indicated to the symbols.
II 56
Explanation/Science/Wittgenstein: we explain an event in physics by describing another event - Analysis: finding out something new - not so in philosophy.
II 60
Music/Language/Wittgenstein: #, b, resolution characters are signals in the strict sense. The language does not consist of signals. A signal must be explained, and the explanation must indicate something, whereby the signal is supplemented. We explain them in the same sense as colors. Besides the word "green" we need something else, additional.
II 61
Explanation/Wittgenstein: the sentence with the explanation is not in this way different from the explanation itself. The explanation of a sentence is always something like a definition that replaces a symbol set by another.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Explanation

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-24