Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Explanation: making a statement in relation to an event, a state, a change or an action that was described before by a deviating statement. The statement will often try to involve circumstances, history, logical premises, causes and causality. See also description, statements, theories, understanding, literal truth, best explanation, causality, cause, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Explanation - Dictionary of Arguments
I (b) 36 Explanation/Law/Lewis: Problem: my behavior is always explained by individual facts premises - Solution: the laws are implied by these individual fact premises - the attributions can only be true if something holds the causal role necessary, e.g., for wishes - this role can only be played by states that are connected causally in the right way with the behavior. >Causal explanation, >Individual causation, >Behavior, >Attribution, >Causal role/Lewis. --- V 218 Explanation/Sylvain Bromberger: something that needs time, language, speaker, etc. - Lewis: also something that can perhaps never be given. V 219 Lewis: even things can explain something. V 220 Event patterns can be described with different descriptions - there is also negative information e.g. about Arctic penguins and that there are no arctic penguins. V 211 Lewis: Thesis: there are no non-causal explanations. V 221 Non-causal explanation/LewisVs: 1) E.g. refractive index - Fermat: light must follow the shortest route - the refractive index is that part of the glass that has not yet been reached by the light - the pattern of alternate routes is part of the explanation, but not part the causal story - the explanation consists in relational information - 2) non-causal: star collapse comes to an end, so as not to violate the Pauli principle - 3) non-causal: possession of anti-bodies does not cause immunity - the immunity consists in the possession of anti-bodies - solution/Lewis: the possession is a disposition - it plays a causal role - solution/Lewis: What is explained is that something protects the patient. V 232 Probability explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation" - it must be distinguished from Fetzer's model: for both are: covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalization about an individual case chances - FetzerVsRailton: as in Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: like argument - LewisVsFetzer: But: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument - LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation, even if the event is extremely unlikely, but in that case a good explanation is a very bad argument - probability/explanation/Hempel: deviates from his deductive-nomological model. >Explanation/Railton. V 238 Explanation/unity/Lewis: Explanation is not a thing of which one can demand unity - rather something of which you can have more or less. LewisVsWhite, Morton: then a "therefore-response" is not an existential statement. V 269 Explanation/Lewis: partly causal, partly non-causal information._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Explanation
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20