Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Explanation: making a statement in relation to an event, a state, a change or an action that was described before by a deviating statement. The statement will often try to involve circumstances, history, logical premises, causes and causality. See also description, statements, theories, understanding, literal truth, best explanation, causality, cause, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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C. Hempel on Explanation - Dictionary of Arguments
Bigelow I 299 Explanation/tradition/laws/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Representatives: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948(1), Hempel 1965(2), Mill 1843/50(3), Jevons 1877(4), Ducasse 1925(5), Feigl 1945(6), Popper 1945(7), Hospers 1946(8)). Hempel/terminology/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter: O: result L: laws C: conditions (sets of sentences, as premises) Then "O" could also be seen as a set of sentences. But we are talking about compound sentences. Then we have: L C O Initial conditions/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: initial conditions are sometimes not needed at all. Sometimes, however, the laws alone do not explain the case: for example, Halley's comet comes back in 60 years, for this we need information about certain facts, it does not only follow from the laws. The facts are contingent, of course. I 301 Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L and C explain O, then they must entail O logically. Otherwise, we have at best a sketch of the explanation that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not yet fully express the idea of the explanation by "deriving from laws": the laws must be used and not only mentioned. In other words, there must be a reliance on laws. BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: N.B.: but these are just apparant explanations! I 302 Just as quackers and magicians often provide an explanation with reference to prestigious natural laws, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: to exclude this, Hempel demands that additionally the premises must be true and O would not have followed if C alone had been without the laws (L). BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: there are still a lot of refinements to be made and special cases to consider. Lewis would call that the "one patch per hole" method. Statistical explanation/probabilistic/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Hempel 1965) here it is impossible to find laws that predict the exact result. However, it may be very likely in certain cases. Or more likely if the law is true than if it was not true. I 303 The statistical explanations are something like derivations from the thing to be explained. And indeed such derivatives, which originate from invalid conclusion. Logical form: the conclusion should be probable, given the premises. Variants: one can demand a high probability from the outset. Or it should be higher than O's without the premises or weaker: that O only has to be made to a certain degree likely, etc. (Lit: Salmon 1982). Bigelow/Pargetter: all this does not differ significantly from the non-statistical explanation. Statistical laws are also part of the set of laws. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: with Hempel's help, we can now broaden our concept of explanation. I 304 If we get the probability of a result, we have explained the result a little bit as well. Statistical explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the end, it is all about whether a result comes out or is likely. We can summarize both cases. "Statistical"/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: "statistical" is only served to attenuate the requirement of logical validity. Explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: an explanation is an open process. This is important. Both the initial conditions can be varied, as well as the laws derived from other laws. Kepler's laws, for example, have been traced back by Newton to deeper ones. These then logically entail the Kepler ones. I 305 Openness/Hempel: openness is that you may be able to find deeper and even deeper laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is one of the strengths of his theory. >Laws, >Natural laws. 1.Hempel, C.G. and P. Oppenheim: Studies in the Logic of Explanation PS, 1984, p. 15. 2.Hempel, C. G.: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: Aspects of Scientific Explanation in the Philosophy of Science. New York 1965: The Free Press. 3. Mill, J. St.: A System of Logic, 1843. 4. Stevons W. J.: The Principle of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method, 2nd edition London 1877: Macmillan Press. 5. Ducasse, C. J.: Explanation, Mechanism and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 22. pp. 150-5. 6. Feigl, H.: Operationism and Scientific Method. Psychological Review 52, 1945, pp. 250-9, 284-8 7. Popper, K. R.: The Open Society and Its Enemies. London 1945. 8. Hospers, J.: On Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 43, 1946, pp. 337-56. - - - Schurz I 224 Explanation/Law/Hempel: The law premises can often be omitted! Humanities/Hempel/Schurz: claimed to be able to provide explanations for them, too, by assuming that laws rule here, too. VsHempel: but these laws are not strict. Hempel: late: for it probabilistic explanation. Schurz I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. Schurz I 225 Explanation/Hempel/Schurz: is the answer to a why-question. Why-question/Hempel: a) Explanation seeker: asks for causes. b) Justification seeker: asks for reasons of belief. I 226 Causes: can serve as reasons for justification. (Also vice versa!). >Causes, >Justification. Structural equality/prediction/explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (early and middle Hempel): Thesis: explanation and prediction are structurally equal. Popper: ditto: causality = prediction-eduction. Explanation and prediction differ only in the pragmatic time circumstances of the becoming known of premises and conclusion. Prediction: here only the premises are known first. Explanation: vice versa. (...) ex ante reasoning/Hempel: = prediction, potential explanation. Explanation: = ex ante reasoning. ManyVs: (...) >Structures, >Microstructure, >Causal explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Schurz._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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> Counter arguments against Hempel
> Counter arguments in relation to Explanation
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19