|Explanation: making a statement in relation to an event, a state, a change or an action that was described before by a deviating statement. The statement will often try to involve circumstances, history, logical premises, causes and causality. See also description, statements, theories, understanding, literal truth, best explanation, causality, cause, completeness.|
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|II 99 ff
Explaining means re-describing
Thesis: explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. That is, in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events.
Caution: It is true that explanations of action do not allow an independent description of the cause, but it is precisely the description of the cause for which this is true, not the cause itself.
Explanation of action/DavidsonVsAristotle: the practical syllogism cannot deal with divergent causal chains (climber-example), and also not with a mere intention (omission, intermittent event), and weakness of will.
Intention/Davidson: Form: Judgment: "x is executable."
Weak will/acrasia/Davidson. irrational judgment - solution: separate action and intention.
"all things-considered" - judgement: only possible for omniscient beings.
Explanation of action/mental/physical/DavidsonVsReductionism: intentionalistic vocabulary is in principle irreducible - not strict laws for the prediction of actions - (anomal monism).
Horwich I 456
Truth/Explanation/Davidson/Rorty: is not an explanation for something - ((s) a phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a proposition that asserts it is true) - also the existence of truth needs no explanation - wrong: e.g. "he did not find the house because his beliefs about its location were wrong" - right: (without truth): "He believed that it was located ---"- explanation: details of what was true or false, not the truth itself - If truth itself was an explanation, it would have to be a cause for something - explanation: not "he did the right thing", but the circumstances - "truth" as explanation would be like tertia (e.g. "intended interpretation", "conceptual schema") idle wheel - Putnam dito.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994