Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Epistemology, philosophy: examines the conditions for the emergence of knowledge and the basis for justification and confirmation. Epistemology cannot explain special cases in which someone who has less information may give more correct answers. See also knowledge, theory, justification, confirmation, reliability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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C. McGinn on Epistemology - Dictionary of Arguments
I 11f McGinn thesis: confusion sets in not because philosophical questions refer to highly problematic, strange beings or facts, but because our cognitive faculties are subject to certain limits. Transcendental Naturalism/"principle of cognitive specificity"/McGinn: indispensable background principle: every knowing being of earthly nature (not of divine nature) shows strong and weak areas of cognitive faculties that depend in the end on their biological equipment. I 121f That means that there is probably no such thing as "general intelligence". >Intelligence. Accordingly, systematic failure in one field does not depend on the objects. Most things which we can understand have no semantic properties. The problem of knowledge is reminiscent of the problem of freedom of will, which also has a kind of stimulus independence. Decisions come about of their own accord, they are not mere effects. I 153 A priori knowledge/McGinn: is not derived from a causal input-output ratio and ignores the perception systems. And not because the stimuli are weak. >a priori/McGinn. At the same time, it is the realization of the solipsist, which is provided to each mind with sufficient inner strength. I 178 Freedom of will/knowledge/McGinn: related problems: cracks and discontinuities, fragmentary data build an extensive knowledge system, the input values do not determine in any case the final state. >Free will/McGinn. I 222 Knowledge pluralism: suggests that it is not true that human reason contained nothing that would be capable of solving philosophical problems. Secrets are secrets only for a particular ability. Maybe there are certain abilities that are philosophically more gifted than our conscious reason._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Epistemology
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18