|Memories: mental repetition of representations without the original stimulus. See also stimuli, knowledge, learning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Frank I 535
Memory/Evans: memory does not provide knowledge. (Ryle dito) - But memory shows other aspects of the "I".
Frank I 544
Quasi-memory/q-memory/Shoemaker: "Quasi-memory": "q-memory" - For example, if there are such false memories, then it makes sense to say "Someone stood before a burning tree, but was that I? " - EvansVs: even if this is possible, it does not follow that the normal judgments must be based on an identification. - It is not about decomposition: "someone stood .. I was the one".
Q-memory: is in fact, from someone else.
A) A subject q remembers an event whose witness it was not. B) Subsequently, the subject q remembers the fact of being a witness - appear/appearance/Evans: it is still correct to say that an apparant memory to have done something, is necessarily an apparent memory that one has done it oneself - (+) purely verbal move: does not show that it is possible for the subject to appear as if there was a tree, without it seeming to it as if there was the tree where it is.
One must state a certain knowledge about the mental states of a subject, e.g. from five minutes ago - this kind of memory is neither a matter of the permanence of an opinion nor a shadow. - The original ability belongs to the equipment of every intelligent creature.
Memory/Evans: e.g. brain transplantation, after which the subject asserts: "Something was F" - This is no judgment, no knowledge, but a mere presumption._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994