Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Satisfaction, logic: a formula is satisfied when their variables are interpreted in a way that the formula as a whole is a true statement. The interpretation is a substitution of the variables of the formula by appropriate constants (e.g. names). When the interpreted formula is true, we call it a model. See also satisfiability, models, model theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Donald Davidson on Satisfaction - Dictionary of Arguments
Glüer II 18 ff "True" is semantic when derived. "Fulfilled" is primarily semantic., >Truth, >Truth theory, >Semantics. - - - I 103 Predicates/Fodor: satisfaction by a subjective state: e.g. "Is this a short-billed hedgehog or a porcupine? - Thought about animals that meet certain general criteria (exactly the ones we use in the decision). I 104 DavidsonVsFodor: these states do not exist - instead: History of learning the word. >Causal theory of knowldge, >Learning, >Translation/Davidson. - - - Glüer II 24 Def satisfaction/Tarski/Glüer: Relation between (ordered) sequences of objects and open sentences. Here the recursive method works: for elementary propositions it is defined which objects they fulfil and rules are given according to which for all compositions of open propositions it can be determined which objects they satisfy. Statements are determined as a special case of open sentences. They either contain no free variables, or they were closed with the help of quantifiers. II 25 With true statements, satisfaction is simple: for whether an ordered sequence of objects satisfies a proposition depends only on the free variable it contains. >Open sentence. Closed proposition/fulfillment: e.g. "The moon is round" does not contain any free variables. Thus the kind of the objects of the respective sequence is completely irrelevant and it can be determined by definition whether such a proposition is true, if it is satisfied by all sequences - or by none. Satisfaction/Quantifiers/Quantification: it is somewhat more complicated for quantified statements: For example "All stars are round" or "There is at least one star that is round", also here the fulfillment is defined in such a way that either all sequences fulfill one sentence or none. Thus it becomes clear that it would be absurd to associate truth of closed propositions with the fulfillment by no sequence of objects. Example A sentence like "All stars are round" is true if there are certain objects that fulfill "X is round": all stars. Def Truth/Tarski/Glüer: a statement is true if it is fulfilled by all objects, otherwise it is false". (Statement: special case of the satisfaction relation). >Statements._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Satisfaction
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-17