Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism. b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W. Sellars on Experience - Dictionary of Arguments
McDowell I 163 Experience/Sellars/McDowell: experience is not possible without concepts that play a role in the system of beliefs. What we regard as the message of experience, is already a part and no external constraint of the system. >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars. Experience/experience history/Sellars: experience history not the result of impressions, but of phenomena. Phenomena/Sellars: phenomena are conceptually (in order to establish them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Beliefs/Sellars. --- I XXXVIII Sellars: Three possible experiences: 1. This is a red object, 2. The object appears to be red (maybe it is white in red light). 3. It looks like it would be an object. (Also hallucination is possible). >Appearance/Sellars. One might assume that they cherish the same thought in all three cases, but obtain a new setting every time towards this thought. (Reductive-materialistic: Armstrong, Dennett). Ambiguity: process or result of process: experience, activities, non-descriptive content - experience object. I 44 Fact/Sellars: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) >Appearance. But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. Experience: we need a name for the experience, which is not only an abbreviation for a description. Does the everyday language have such names? I 44 Experience/Sellars: ambiguity: experiencing: activity, non-descriptive content - experience object: the fact that something over there this seems to be red, is not experiencing. -However: the common descriptive core can be an experiencing - facts: are experienced, but are not an experiencing- and no experience. I 45 Experience/Sellars: Problem: sensation always seems to presuppose an object. - Possible solution: should we align sensations and propositional attitudes? >Sensations. - "Vs: this is the approximation leading to Locke/Descartes - Descartes/Locke: sensations on a stage with ideas. - SellarsVs._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, |
||
> Counter arguments against Sellars
> Counter arguments in relation to Experience
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16