|Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism.|
b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
|McDowell I 73
Experience/Evans: experience is not conceptual. But it has representative content.
McDowellVsEvans: experience is conceptual.
Definition experience/Evans: a state of an information system is only an experience if it is the input of a thinking, conceptual and logically information system. >Information system/Evans.
E.g. animals probably have a feeling for pain, but no a concept of pain.
Pain/McDowell: pain is not conceptual, it is inner experience.
Experience/McDowell/Evans: in both of us the experience in the Kantian sense is limited, by the connection to the spontaneity (conceptuality).
Experience/Evans: although it is not conceptually in Evans (and therefore, according to Kant, it must be blind), he wants to protect it by asserting a "content". That is, an objective property of reality must be present to the subject. Namely, as an apparent view of the world.
McDowellVsEvans: without concepts, that does not make any sense.
Evans: on the other hand, he makes the demand that perception objects must be supported by an "accompanying theory".
McDowell: that is precisely the >spontaneity.
McDowell I 80/81 ff
Experience/Evans: its richness of detail cannot be grasped with terms!
For example, there are much more color shades that can be experienced than concepts which are available for these color shades. ((s) The notion of difference is sufficient when samples are present.)
EvansVsDavidson: (different horn of the dilemma): experience is probably outer conceptual, but still subject to rational control by the outside world.
Frank I 524f
Experience/Evans: experience is different from self-attribution: it is not clearly true/false.
Judgment: although judgments are based on experience (non-conceptual), they are not about the state of information - the "inner state" deos not become the object.
Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994