Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Event: A change of state. The event itself has no duration, otherwise the beginning and the end of the event would have to have their own duration or the beginning and the end of an event in turn would be independent events. See also regress, process, flux, change, states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Donald Davidson on Events - Dictionary of Arguments
Events/Action/Davidson: action is description-dependent (Mary-example: Mary shoots the lion and kills the cow). - In contrast: Events are independent of description. >Description dependence. Glüer II 86 ff VsEvent-Ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier theory": has no events, ia not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus. Jaegwon Kim: identifies events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of properties. Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. >Ontology/Davidson. Distinguishing between event token and description. Only then, it is clear, what sense it makes to speak of variously described event tokens, as far as these descriptions contain no intentional adverbs. Thus, there is no subclass of intentional actions. >Actions, >Intentions. But Mary has long since stopped shooting when the burglar dies. But that does not change the fact that it is about descriptions of one and the same event token. The rest is left to nature. Mountaineer-Example: is a mere event, not an intentional action. Event/Davidson: all events can be explained in principle with regard to the operations of the natural laws. (McDowell). Glüer II 97 Def Events/Davidson/Glüer: an identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff a and b have identical causes and consequences - Glüer: then the causal relationship forms a coordinate system in which each event is uniquely determined - QuineVsDavidson: Regress: Causes and consequences are again events, which have again a place in the net - Davidson: VsDavidson: assumes Quine's criterion for objects: Glüer II 89 Def Identity for objects/Quine: have the same space time coordinates - Event/Davidson/new: two events can happen at the same time in the same location. >Identification. Glüer II 189 Problem: E.g. muscle soreness in singing running - Solution/Davidson: Language instead of coordinates - metaphysical ontological assumptions of everyday language. Solution/Davidson: Description. Glüer II 101 Description/event/Davidson: E.g. Mary shot at the burglar, but he dies much later. - Identity theory of the events: Problem: the same action - solution: these are descriptions of the same event tokens - Mary only needs to pull the trigger to kill, the rest does the nature._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19