Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Epistemic/ontological: ontological questions relate to the existence of entities that cause perceptions - epistemic questions reflect their recognizability. The question of a principal recognizability itself is ontological and metaphysical. See also metaphysics, ontology, existence, realism, reality, perception._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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R. Chisholm on Epistemic/ontologic - Dictionary of Arguments
I 113 Epistemic/Evauate/Chisholm: epistemic terms: E.g. What is reasonable? - Restraint? - E.g. if agnosticism is not more reasonable than theism, then theism is more reasonable. I 115 Epistemic levels - e.g. atheism: hold suspected for something - be acceptable - beyond a reasonable doubt - evident - certainly - (applies to propositions). >Propositions. - - - II 47-52 Epistemic terms/Chisholm: basic concept: more reasonable than; acceptable, certain, evident - SchrammVsChisholm: when objectively reasonable, then independent from the subject, then independent from accepting, even from knowledge, etc. >Knowledge. It must also be possible that the subject act according to what it does not believe - even against evidence! >Evidence. Solution/Chisholm: self-presentation "factual component": the subject agrees. >Subjectivity, >Objectivity. SchrammVs: Dilemma a) an objective rationality lacks factual components b) when the subject is consenting the concepts do not obey the epistemic logic Schramm: always something new is "more reasonable". >Rationality. Schramm, Alfred. Ein Dilemma für Chisholm „Begriffe der epistemischen Bewertung“. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Epistemic/ontologic
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16