Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Empiricism: a branch within epistemology which assumes that sensory perception is fundamental for setting up claims and theories. The opposite position, rationalism, assumes that even purely logical knowledge and conclusions from this knowledge may be sufficient for the building of theories. See also logical positivism, instrumentalism, rationalism, epistemology, theories, foundation, experiments, > inferentialism, knowledge, experience, science._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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J. Fodor on Empiricism - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 191 Empiricism/Fodor/LeporeVsEmpiricism: empiricism cannot show the similarities of the concepts of uncle/aunt, ice/vapor, President/Cleopatra, etc. (they are conceptual). You cannot reduce conceptual relations to relations between observational concepts. >Observation, >Concepts, >World/Thinking, >Language. Network: observational concepts are on the periphery. Theoretical terms are in the center. >Network/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |