Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Quine II 39 ff
Empirical content are categorical observation sentences: they are linking theory and observation. Two theories are equivalent if all categorical observation sentences are identical. The theory implies categorical observation sentences without being implied by them. Theoretical terms do not occur in categorical observation sentences.
>Observation Sentences/Quine.
II 43
Nevertheless, science cannot get along without the indication of places and points of time. But we have pushed them up into the realm of theoretical concepts, where they belong, at a comfortable distance from observation.
This is another step forward in relating theory to their sensory evidence. The relationship is that true categorical observation sets are implied by the theory formulation. And how do we know that a categorical observation is true? We will never get to this end conclusively by observation! But we can falsify.
VI 22
Empirical content/Quine: empirical content is something common to sentences, and even mathematical sentences indirectly participate in it.
VI 23/24
Def testable/Quine: a sentence or a sentence set is testable if it implies some categorical observational sentences that are synthetic. (It can also be possible to check individual sentences, but mostly considerable quantities of sentences. Holism imposes this burden on us, >Holism/Quine).
Def synonymous/Quine: two categorical observation sentences are synonymous if each of the components concerned have the same stimulus significance.
Def Empirical Content/Quine: the set of all synthetic categorical observation sentences implied by this sentence. (For a single speaker).
They are equivalent for the community if they are equivalent for each individual speaker. Content only applies to sentences and sentence quantities that can be checked.
VI 24/25
Science/Review/Quine: a large part of science is shielded from unreal conditional propositions or dispositions from simple experience tests by excuses such as vagueness.
VI 75
Indeterminacy/Logic/Logical Connectives/Translation/Meaning/Quine: in fact, translations down to the categorical observational sentences and even the connectives have a certain determination. However, only verifiable sentences have empirical content.
XI 27
Empirical Content/Quine/Lauener: no isolated sentence can be attributed a clear empirical content because of the resolution of the separation analytical/synthetic. Only the totality of science makes sense.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Quine

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-28
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration