Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Sensation: ability to detect differences between own inner states related to stimuli. Sensations are fundamentally for perceptions and unlike them not linked to linguistic abilities. See also sensory impression, impression, perception, stimulation, stimuli, emotion, experience.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 114
Ryle: sensations are behavioral dispositions. (RortyVs).
VI 407
You never know how red feels without knowing that it is different from blue, or that it is a color, etc.
There is no raw material of sensation.
- - -
Frank I 597
Def sensation/Rorty: not perception (not acquisition of opinions), but the entities that we report with sentences like "I had a sensation of red". (Simple, unanalyzed).
Def perception/Rorty: acquisition of opinions (unlike simple sensation).
Frank I 600
Inner perception/Rorty: everything mental is internally perceptible and vice versa - but it is not a characteristic of the mental that e.g. the perception of an upset stomach is not considered a case of inner perception, because indeed the object is physical. - So we can only determine inner perception if we have previously clarified the concept of the mental. - Non-spatiality may not be a characteristic - e.g. mass has no shape. - Solution: no state of an object has a shape or size anyway.
- - -
Rorty VI 407
Sensation/Rorty: there is no raw material of sensation. - Davidson: nevertheless senses play merely a causal role.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Rorty

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Export as BibTeX Datei
Legal Notice & Contact   Data protection declaration

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-20