Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Sensation: ability to detect differences between own inner states related to stimuli. Sensations are fundamentally for perceptions and unlike them not linked to linguistic abilities. See also sensory impression, impression, perception, stimulation, stimuli, emotion, experience._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Chr. Peacocke on Sensations - Dictionary of Arguments
I 5 Perception/experience/tradition/Peacocke: experience has a content. >Empirical content, >Content On the other hand: Feeling/sensations/tradition: sensation has no content. - E.g. sensation of smallness. - It may nevertheless be a certain sensation. >Knowledge, >Thinking, >World/Thinking, >Distinctions. I 21 Sensation / Perceptional Characteristics / Peacocke: have, as the representational, reliable and publicly identifiable causes. - They can be used also for the explanation of behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation. Ad I ~ 50 Non-representational, sensational/Peacocke/(s): e.g. variation of loudness, pitch, timbre. >Representation, >Perception._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |