|Particular, individual thing, philosophy: this is about the problems associated with the introduction of linguistic expressions for objects that can be specified as individuals. See also individuation, objects, thing, identification, specification, singular terms, general term, universals._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
E. Tugendhat on Particulars - Dictionary of Arguments
Particular /object / TugendhatVsDonnellan: localizing descriptions are fundamental - for these there is no difference ref. / att. - attributive is also referential in the broad sense, because the objects although not identified, are specified (against a background).
Particulars / identification / TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" are sufficient to make objects and space-time points existent - space-time-points are the most basic objects - but there must be also something - at least hypothetically, then a question provides the relevant issue of verification for which object the singular term stands.- top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions - Bottom-up: when the verfication situation for applying the predicate is referred to by demonstratives._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992