Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Particular, individual thing, philosophy: this is about the problems associated with the introduction of linguistic expressions for objects that can be specified as individuals. See also individuation, objects, thing, identification, specification, singular terms, general term, universals.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Graeser I 163
Particulars/Strawson: Particulars have priority in our conceptual system - ability to attribute consciousness to predicates necessary. Condition for them for physical predicates.
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Graeser I 224
Strawson: These particulars take precedence of processes or events that we could not identify without them.
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Newen/Schrenk I 150
VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: why should just particulars be the most fundamental reference objects of subject terms and not events? - Strawson: because objects are recognizable after some time - his arguments are transcendental.
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Strawson I 35 ~
Particular/Strawson: as long as it is isolated from the rest of the knowledge, we can learn nothing new about it.
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I 51
Particular/Strawson: is there a class of particular on which all others depend? - Maybe dependent "private particular" - Elementary: Class of People - Tradition: private particular: "Emotions" fundamental.
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I 52
Principium indivduationis/Strawson: is based on identity of persons.
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I 70
Particular/Strawson: material bodies: fundamental for the identification - not for process - StrawsonVsRussell: not biography instead of the names.
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I 72
Description of particular does not force to mention the process - but identification dependency of processes of the particulars in which they take place - because things require space, processes not always.
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I 175
Particular/properties/Strawson: one cannot only refer identifying to particulars - VsTradition: therefore object character is not a criterion for particulars.
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I 176 RamseyVs
Particular/properties/RamseyVsTradition: from the fact that two things are linked, it does not follow that they must have different characters - Strawson:> 1. grammatical criterion for distinguishing between things and activities - 2. categorical criterion.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-17