Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Bare Truth: atomic statement sentences, which are not a composition of sentence parts, can be simply true. In particular, conditional sentences and counterfactual conditionals cannot be simply true, i.e. even if they are true, they cannot be verified by stating a fact. See also laws, natural laws, causal laws, causality, regularity, counterfactual conditional.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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"Simply true"/Dummett: irreducible - If a sentence is not simply true, its truth sentence is non-trivial: i.e. the truth sentence for the sentence S does not have S itself on the right side.
II 100
Important Argument: counterfactual conditionals (counterfactual conditional) cannot be simply true means: we cannot imagine what the ability of identifying the truth would have to look like.
II 95
"Barely true": model: observation, we know what it means for the tree to be taller than the other one.
EMD II 106
Simply true/Dummett: a sentence is simply true if there is no set of sentences out of which none is a trivial variant of the original sentence, and the truth of all of which defines the original sentence as true - then the trivial Tarski scheme fits: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white.
"True because"/True/Dummett: a sentence that cannot be simply true: E.g. conjunction: is the true because of both conjuncts - disjunction: true because of one of the disjuncts - universal quantification: truth-power of all instances - which has led some philosophers to to say that there is no "disjunctive fact". - N.B.: this allows to characterize the concept of reduction of a class of sentences to another class.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-21