Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
"Simply true"/Dummett: irreducible - If a sentence is not simply true, its truth sentence is non-trivial: i.e. the truth sentence for the sentence S does not have S itself on the right side.
II 100
Important Argument: counterfactual conditionals (counterfactual conditional) cannot be simply true means: we cannot imagine what the ability of identifying the truth would have to look like.
II 95
"Barely true": model: observation, we know what it means for the tree to be taller than the other one.
EMD II 106
Simply true/Dummett: a sentence is simply true if there is no set of sentences out of which none is a trivial variant of the original sentence, and the truth of all of which defines the original sentence as true - then the trivial Tarski scheme fits: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white.
"True because"/True/Dummett: a sentence that cannot be simply true: E.g. conjunction: is the true because of both conjuncts - disjunction: true because of one of the disjuncts - universal quantification: truth-power of all instances - which has led some philosophers to to say that there is no "disjunctive fact". - N.B.: this allows to characterize the concept of reduction of a class of sentences to another class.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26