|Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.|
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|Rorty VI 151
Major property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself."
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless.
Mass Terminus/Quine: is archaic(> Cassirer) -> Properties a) commonality b) Scattered clumps?
Features: usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains.
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back abstract objects - faithfully distinguished of concrete objects by use of "-ness".
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun.
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal logic) - only more or less important properties.
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions).
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46).
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes.
The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables.
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties.
Properties: hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things.
properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
Properties as last classes every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief de re (essential property).
Modal logic/Quine: entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000