|Quine, Two Dogmas of Empricism:|
1st Dogma distinction analytic/synthetic - 2nd Dogma reductionism. The belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refer to immediate experience. - Quine, W.V.O. (1951), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted in his 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. See also analytic/synthetic, reduction, reductionism, conceptual schemes, holism. Later D. Davidson discussed a 3rd dogma (separation scheme/content)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
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1st Dogma/QuineVsFirst Dogma: (Differentiation between analytic and synthetic) against the idea that the truth of a synthetic sentence depends on two things: on meaning and on the world. ((s) One cannot have the meaning before the world).
Quine, however, preserves the duality: "Obviously the truth depends both on language and on extraneous facts."
McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we cannot just keep them apart from each other, sentence for sentence.
2nd Dogma/QuineVsSecond Dogma: Instead, Holism. Science is, collectively seen, dependent on both language and experience. However, this double character cannot be pursued in a meaningful way up until the individual statements of science. ((s) We cannot ask: what in this sentence corresponds more to the world and what more to the language.)
Dogmas/McDowell: the first could only be correct, if the second is correct.
If only "empiricist meaning" cannot be assigned to individual sentences, the idea of a "sentence without empiricist meaning" is questioned._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001