Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
II 1 f
Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability.
- - -
Place III 113
Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable.
- - -
Armstrong II 4f
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals.
Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong.
Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them.
II 5
Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong.
II 6
Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual.
Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations.
II 6
Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause).
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Place II 62
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties.
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II (c) 90
Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects.
Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions.
ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions.
Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property?
II (c) 90/91
Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Truthmaker/Armstrong: The point of the story is the question of the truth maker: according to Martin, it must be irreducible "in" the particle - Vs: this requires platonistic, never instantiated Laws of nature. >Natural laws/Armstrong.
II 92
II 93
Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong.
II (c) 94
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected.
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Place III 108
Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure.
Place III 109
Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties.
Place III 119
Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation.
Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement.
- - -
Martin III 163
Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation.
Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. -
Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners.
Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Martin III 165
Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality.
Martin III 166
Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation.
II 174
Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-07-04
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