Dictionary of Arguments

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Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
II 1 f
Disposition: Problem of unobservability.
- - -
Place III 113
Verifivation/Place: of disp prop: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable.
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Armstrong II 4f
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only disp) properties fulfil CoCo - Armstrong: are not made true by CoCo - Martin: it can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispo cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the CoCo, which often contain them
II 5
Armstrong: Thesis: dispositional = categorical properties: microstructure (therefore dispo no possibilia) - others: categorical "realizes" dispositional properties.
II 6
Dispo/Martin: just as actual - perverse to call it non-actual - Dispo/Armstrong: are not in themselves causes - (others dito) - Dispo always actual, just not their manifestations - II 6 Example Wire/Martin: Problem: a CoCo can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: "electro-finch": instead brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) wrong cause).
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Place II 62
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (cat prop), therefore they cannot be identical with the disp prop.
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II (c) 90
Dispo/Armstrong/Place/Martin: "in" the ED - Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our EP - > irreducible dispo - ArmstrongVs: no irreducible dispo - Armstrong: why suppose that particles have prop in addition to have the manifested purely cat prop?
II (c) 90/91
Martin Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: in the real world, dispositionality is an irreducible side, connected with all cat prop.
True Maker/Armstrong: The point of the story is the question of the true maker: according to Martin, it must be irreducible "in" the particle - Vs: requires platonistic, never instantiated LoN - II 92 but the non-disp prop plus "strong" LoN which connect these non-disp prop are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction necessary - II 93 Armstrong: certain CoCo apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically.
II (c) 94
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispo: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected.
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Place III 108
Dispo/Martin: Solution: View particles without structure
Place III 109
Martin Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no MiSt allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the prop of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between cat and disp prop.
Place III 119
Purely dispositiona properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation - parts/whole separate entities, as causal relation in order - disp prop of the whole effect of the disp prop of the parts and their arrangement.
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Martin III 163
Dispo: Place: outside the entities, prop of interaction (MartinVs: confusion with manifestation - Armstrong: within? - rather in the connection - Martin reciprocal reaction partner - Ryle: not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Martin III 165
Dispo (MartinVsPlace: his introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispo is a doubling of causality.
Martin III 166
Dispo/Martin: are always completely actual, even without manifestation - II 174 not in the eye of the beholder - unlike ability.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


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