|Forms of arguments, typical patterns.:|
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|Examples of forms of thinking in Rorty's works
The 17th century "misunderstood" the mirror of nature or the inner eye as little as Aristotle the natural movement or Newton the gravitation. One could not misunderstand them, because one invented them.
"Rightly held to be true" is not the same as "true".
One can hardly say, "mental" means something in reality "that could turn out to be something physical", as well as one cannot say, e.g. "criminal behavior" means in reality something like "behavior that can turn out to be innocent".
Abstract/concrete: the distinction must also be relativized to a given data base, such as the distinction of the complex and the simple.
Doubling: Rorty: the action, that templates led as Lockean ideas to a doubling of the explanandum, is like the claim, the particles of the Bohr-atom would double the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((S) 1. inversion, 2. analogies are anyway no doubling.) However, it turns out that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls.
The language of thought or any code, can have no honor status, (not even for Fodor) because a mere code is not a means to distinguish the truth from falsehood.
RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that one must first demonstrate X as a special case of Y to treat X as Y. As if one could not simply handle X as Y, to see what happens.
III 169 ff
Contingency: contingencies in literary narratives are meaningful only in retrospect.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000