|De se: belief de se is an attitude that one has towards oneself. Problem - self-identification is not completely safe from error. See also de re, de dicto._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
|Frank I 16 ~
Definition de se/Lewis: the self-attribution of individuating properties occurs with a belief de se (of oneself) - this cannot be analyzed as a belief de dicto - but vice versa: Belief de dicto and de re can be analyzed as a belief de se - narrower sense: self-attribution of properties that locate the individual in space and time - Castaneda: indexical references are not reducible to each other - VsLewis: therefore, apart from the belief de se, we actually also need a "de te", "de nunc", "de ibi" etc.
Lewis IV ~ 121
Attitudes de se/Lewis: the attitudes that you irreducibly have about yourself are not propositional - but they can also be expressed by sentences - but they are not propositions - e.g. one considers oneself a fool - then you express more a property than a proposition.
De se/Wish/Lewis: objects of wishes are often properties, not propositions - must not be shared by all the inhabitants of the same world - Proposition/Lewis/(s) is true or not true in a possible world - then it applies to all, not in relation to certain persons.
De se/Lewis: certain role (localization in a certain way) in possible world e.g. being the "winner" oneself (equivalent to property) - de dicto: only wish for world with winners and losers (equivalent to proposition) - E.g. 2 gods: the two do not differ with respect to any proposition - when it comes to sitting on the highest mountain and throwing Manna they can do it or leave it._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994