|de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.|
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|EMD II 293
must de re/Wiggins: thesis to keep (4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)] away from opaque contexts, we must presume must de re: E.g. "the number of planets that is 9, must be greater than 7." - if we apply this on the relation of the identity (lx)(ly)(x = y) , we get necessarily [(lx)(ly)(x = y)] - or the relation which has all r and all s if they are necessarily identical - then variant of (4): (4l)(x)(y)(x = y)> (y has(Iz)[[necessary[(lr)(ls)[s = r]]],[x, z]])) - that needs the contingency theory: then the definition of "is necessarily identical with" depends no longer on the possible world - problem: this might not exist in English.
Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being essentially in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place: (Human(x2)) - reason: it could be that "human" would not have meant "human".
General problem: asymmetry, de re - E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI. - But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter - E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as part - E.g. Chisholm: But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say that substructure and board are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure - Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this: [(lx)(ly)[xRy] = [(ly)(lx)[y converse-Rx] - it would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L - Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist - solution: more specific description of the essential properties, e.g. trough points in time: (t)(table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t)) then necessary[(ly)(lw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg].
That secures the desired asymmetry. Problem: because the existential generalization does not work for the necessity-of-origin doctrine - more general solution: distinction: wrong: [Necessary[(lx) (ly)(x consists of y], [leg, table] - undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven through it - and [Necessary [(lx) (x consists of table], [leg](also wrong) - and finally: [Necessary (ly)(leg consists of y], [table] - (what is right or false depending on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right).
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989