Richard Rorty on de re - Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author	Item	Summary	Meta data
Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments


de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism. _____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Rorty, Richard	de re	VI 195 belief de re / Rorty: e.g. Mary thinks of the cow that it is a deer. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.	Ro I R. Rorty Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Ro II R. Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Ro III R. Rorty Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Ro IV R. Rorty Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993 Ro V R. Rorty Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998 Ro VI R. Rorty Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-24