|de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
Faith/relation/existence/Prior: the existence of the object cannot be constituted by the relation, without that the believer knows of it - E.g. that someone believes "of" Walters horse that it has wings, must depend on that Walter has a normal horse: absurd: then the believer would not know what he is doing - not de re: E.g. Sid sees Walters (wingless) horse in the pasture and says, "that's not Walter's horse". no belief "of" - beliefs about existing probably relation, but not "of" relation - e.g. "everything that he said is true: for example: that Jonny has measles - but Mrs.Murphy does not know what measles are: no belief "of" - relationship only comes about when all positions are occupied - E.g. Sid believes that certain horses have wings - supposing there is one, then he would suddenly stand in a relation to this. - Solution: he stands in the same relation to all horses: to those who make belief true and to those who make it wrong - belief "of": not possible with non-existing things, but: N.B.: a "2. stage" must be possible : to believe that another believes something "of" something non-existing - ((s) "de re" is not mentioned by Prior._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003