Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Thinking: Thinking is a cognitive process that involves mental activities such as reasoning, problem solving, decision making, imagination and conceptualization. These operations enable individuals to process information, make sense of their experiences and interact with the world around them._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
Ludwig Wittgenstein on Thinking - Dictionary of Arguments
II 45f Plan/Wittgenstein: Thinking means to operate with plans - the thought needs no interpretation - the plan needs an interpretation - the rules of interpretation of a plan do not belong to the plan itself - science: like building a house - philosophy: like tidying. Cf. >Interpretation, >Planning. II 46 Thinking/Wittgenstein: is a symbolic operation - analog: E.g. digestion: a) characteristic of a human being - b) chemical process - Definition thinking: interpretation of a plan - Telepathy: could only be interpretation of symbols - at the same level as language. II 50 Thinking/Language/Wittgenstein: we think with the help of the sign. To think of a thing means to think of a sentence in which it occurs - the occasion does not belong to thinking - but the words do - one sentence is a mechanism - not a bunch of individual parts. >Words, >Signs, >Objects, >Picture theory. II 67 Thinking/Wittgenstein: no "representative in the mind" - the thought is autonomous - it does not point beyond itself - we only believe that because of the way we use symbols - there is no mental process that cannot be symbolized - we are only interested in what can be symbolized. >Symbols, II 105 Thinking/Language/Wittgenstein: Thinking not possible without language. >Language and thought, >Language. --- IV 108 Thinking/Tractatus: 6.361 in the way of expression by Hertz one could say: only legitimate connections are conceivable. >Conceivability. --- VII 10 Thinking/expression/limit/Tractatus/Foreword/Wittgenstein: not the thinking, but the expression is a drawn limit. >Expressions. VII 12 Kant/Tetens: knowledge: the frontier of knowledge can be crossed in both directions - sense/nonsense/Wittgenstein/Tetens: this limit cannot be exceeded. VII 82 Language/thinking/Tractatus/Tetens: what we think must be logically possible. (See Tractatus 4.031)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |