Dictionary of Arguments

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Deflationism: collective term for theories that conceive truth as a property of sentences, not as something that should be realized (> pragmatism). The basis for deflationism is the scheme of Tarki’s definition of truth like "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. See also disquotationalism, theories of truth, truth definition, meaning theory, meaning holism, holism, prosentential theory, translation, pragmatism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Deflationism/knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist.
I 108
VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel - MA: "possibly A" -
I 110
Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility.
I 113
Deflationism/Field: does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known.
Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement - Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A.
II 104
Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central for meaning and content. - Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions.
II 108
Deflationism/Field: Main point: that he does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions.
II 114
Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that he does not have to make this choice (between facts). Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization.
II 116
Deflationism/Gavagai: for him there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits.
II 117
Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. - Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic ascent.
II 118
Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the Deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume.
Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the truth conditions p", or not.
II 127
VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist ..." (> Strawson)
2. He cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success)
3. He cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse
4. He cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages
5. He gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true")
6. He cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa
7. He cannot explain learning.
Ad II 260
Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For him, it is senseless to ask why "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.) >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-21
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