## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Deflationism: collective term for theories that conceive truth as a property of sentences, not as something that should be realized (> pragmatism). The basis for deflationism is the scheme of Tarki’s definition of truth like "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. See also disquotationalism, theories of truth, truth definition, meaning theory, meaning holism, holism, prosentential theory, translation, pragmatism. | |||

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Books on Amazon |
91 Deflationism/Knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist. --- I 108 VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel. --- I 110 Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility. --- I 113 Deflationism/Field: does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known. - Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement - Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A. --- II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions (tr.c.) are central for meaning and content - Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions. --- II 108 Deflationism/Field: Main point: that he does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions. --- II 114 Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that he does not have to make this choice (between facts). Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization. --- II 116 Deflationism/Gavagai: for him there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits. --- II 117 Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. - Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic rise. --- II 118 Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the Deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume. --- II Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the WB p", or not. --- II 127 VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist ..." (> Strawson) - 2. He cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success) - 3. He cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse - 4. He cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages - 5. He gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true") - 6. He cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa - 7. He cannot explain learning. --- Ad II 260 Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For him, it is senseless to ask why - "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.) |
Fie I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Fie II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Fie III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25