|Definition: determination of the use of linguistic signs (words, symbols, connectives) for non-linguistic or linguistic objects. New definitions are not supposed to be creative, that is, they are to be derived from the use of the signs already employed. See also definability, conservativity, systems, theories, models, reference systems, context definition, explicit defnition, implicit definition._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Hoyningen-Huene II 56
Definition/truth value table/Junctor/Hoyningen-Huene: the tables define the junctors only if they are understood mathematically - not if they are understood extensionally.
Hoyningen-Huene II 93
Definition/Hoyningen-Huene: synthetic: here a concept is created (abbreviation) - it cannot be true/false - analytical: descriptive or lexical definition: here, an existing concept is analyzed - e.g. bachelor unmarried - explication: is between analytical and synthetic definition - it can be more fruitful.
Read III 40
The definition of truth is different from the adequacy conditions.
Prior: "tonk": does not define connections first and then meaning. >tonk- Then it cannot cause another pair of statements to be equivalent. - N.B.: "analytical validity" cannot show this - BelnapVsPrior: (pro analytical validity): should not get mixed with the definition of existence, it first has to show how it works -> classical negation is illegitimate here. - Negation-free fragment - > Peirce's law: "If P, then Q, only if P, only if P":
Salmon I 252
Some words must be defined in non-linguistic ways.
Context definition: many logical words are explained by context definition. E.g. "All F are G" is equal to "Only F are G" This is a definition of the word "only"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Wesley C. Salmon
Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973
Logik Stuttgart 1983
The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967
Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007