Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Definition: determination of the use of linguistic signs (words, symbols, connectives) for non-linguistic or linguistic objects. New definitions are not supposed to be creative, that is, they are to be derived from the use of the signs already employed. See also definability, conservativity, systems, theories, models, reference systems, context definition, explicit defnition, implicit definition._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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| III 342 Definition/Kripke: "great fundamental principle": Definitions must be formulated in a language already understood - then there is little room for alternative interpretations of a metalanguage - (even if syntactic and semantic structure can be interpreted differently) - (>Loewenheim). III 390 Implicit Definition/Kripke: by rule - otherwise no generalizations in finite systems can be derived from (infinite) instances. III 392 Definition/Kripke: No inductive definition is possible if it does not start with a general characterization of the atomic (basic) case. III 393 Direct Definition: Not recursive - recursive definition: indirect, in Tarski definition of truth via recursive definition of fulfillment - Question: could he also have defined truth directly? If so, would fulfillment be definable in terms of truth? III 399 Implicit Definition: Depends on axioms. These imply (for example) truth implicit in the sense that truth is the only interpretation of the predicate T(x) which makes all the axioms true - explicit definition: does not depend on axioms, but on expressive power of the language (not theory) - Sat1(x,y) is explicitly definable in terms of T(x) - explicit definition by introducing a new variable (II 402). --- Kripke I 66ff Definition/reference/standard meter/Kripke: He does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. There is a certain length which he would like to denote. He denotes it through an accidental property. Someone else may refer to the same reference by another accidental property. He can still definitely say: If heat had been in the game, the length would have changed. Rigid: meter - not rigid: length of S at time t. I 136f The "definition" does not say that the two terms are synonymous, but that we have determined the reference of the term "one meter" by establishing that it should be a rigid designation expression that actually has the length S. So not a necessary truth! We must distinguish between definitions that specify a reference, and definitions that specify a synonym. Definition: not necessary: E.g. tiger: large, carnivorous, four legged cat, etc. Suppose someone says: "This is the meaning of tiger in German". ZiffVs: this is wrong. E.g. a tiger with three legs is not a contradiction in itself. I 153 In the case of proper names the reference can be defined in various ways. Determination of reference: A priori (contingent) - not synonymous. Meaning: analytical (required) Definition: specifies reference and expresses a priori truth._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Definitions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-01-23