Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Definability: is about the question whether the meanings of linguistic elements and symbols of a statement in a given frame, a theory, a model or a system can be stated in a way that these elements and symbols can be replaced by other symbols. This replacement is to aid understanding. Is this the case new symbols (words, terms, links) can be created the meaning of which can be understood from the symbols already defined. Therefore these new symbols are definable. See also definition, context definition, implicit definition, explicit definition, models, systems, theories, foundation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
EMD II 393
Definability/Fulfillment/Truth/Kripke: In some cases truth can be defined, but not fulfilled - e.g. if the ontology of real numbers is not achievable in the meta language, but in the object language. - If R(x) (truth of atomic sentences) is a simple basic concept, then truth theory only with referential quantification about expressions of the object language and no fulfillment. ((s) Because there are no objects.)
EMD II 393
Truth/Fulfillment/Definability: Truth can be definable in a meta language (for a given referential object language), but not fulfilling, because the corresponding ontology is not achievable in the meta language. - E.g. the set of true sentences will be definable in different meta languages whose ontology is that of the integers (e.g. meta language assumes the truth for the object language as a simple predicate - Fulfillment: will not be definable unless the ontology of the object language is the one of the integers.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-20