|De dicto: statements about the nature of linguistic expressions and their consequences are de dicto. Concepts necessarily have certain characteristics, as opposed to objects (res) the properties of which are considered as contingent by many authors. See also de re, modality, necessity de re.|
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|EMD II 303
necessary/De dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x) (x = Cicero)> (x is a man) - de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong: necessarily (Ez) (x) (x = z> (x is a man).
EMD II 312
De dicto/Necessary/Metalanguage/Wiggins: I must still be dissuaded from reading "necessary" metalinguistically de dicto, namely as a predicate of sentences that has a broader sense than is provable.
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989