Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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De dicto: statements about the nature of linguistic expressions and their consequences are de dicto. Concepts necessarily have certain characteristics, as opposed to objects (res) the properties of which are considered as contingent by many authors. See also de re, modality, necessity de re.
 
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II 249
De dicto: only concerning the mental contents - de re: relationships between people and
objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. - ((s) so they should always be concerned with mental contents and never with objects?)
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II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll: all beliefs are de dicto - de re beliefs are a subclass - QuineVs: irreducible belief de re: is between the believer and the objects - in addition to the de dicto beliefs - (much stronger thesis) - brains in a vat: purely de dicto - SearleVsQuine: if the world would change, the beliefs would change, even if everything stays the same in the head.
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II 262
General desire for a sailing boat: de dicto - for a more specific: de re.
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II 263
SearleVsQuine: Then in the general case allegedly context free but: BurgeVsQuine: contextually bound beliefs cannot be characterized completely by their intentional content (not only as a relation between concept and object) - de dicto/Burge: E.g. red hat in the fog, "there is a man who ..." -Searle: that is enough to individuate any de re- counterpart - the same man can belong to fulfillment conditions for very different perceptions.
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II 268
Thesis, there are forms of intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23