|De dicto: statements about the nature of linguistic expressions and their consequences are de dicto. Concepts necessarily have certain characteristics, as opposed to objects (res) the properties of which are considered as contingent by many authors. See also de re, modality, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
I / use / Nozick: all semantic facts about what the use of "I" is, need to refer to de dicto, not de re -_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994